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Abstract 
Elliptic curve cryptography finds enormous applications because of its 
security offering using the remarkable property of elliptic curve. The 
Elliptic curve cryptography finds enormous applications in almost all 
the emerging areas. However in mobile networks, the usage of elliptic 
curve  cryptography  is  limited.  Moreover,  the  operation  of  mobile 
networks in an un-trusted environment increases the significance of 
the usage of security protocols. To provide a secure environment, an 
improved  authentication  protocols  are  required  as  the  menacing 
effects increasing. Hence, in the previous works, we have proposed 
two  authentication  protocols.  One  of  the  protocols  performs  direct 
authentication  and  the  other  one  performs  indirect  authentication. 
However, the performance of both of them has to be analyzed. Hence 
in  this  paper,  a  comparative  analysis  is  made  between  the  two 
authentication  protocols.  The  analysis  is  done  empirically  as  well 
experimentally.  For  performance  analysis,  the  efficiency  measures 
such  as computational overhead,  communication  overhead,  storage 
overhead  and  total  computational  complexity  and  the  effectiveness 
measures such as replay attack, guessing attack and Stolen-Verifier 
attack are considered.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The  rapid  progress  in  wireless  mobile  communication 
technology and personal communication systems has prompted 
new  security  questions.  Since  open  air  is  used  as  the 
communication channel, the content of the communication may 
be exposed to an eavesdropper, or system services can be used 
fraudulently. In order to have reliable proper security over the 
wireless communication channel, certain security measures need 
to be provided [12].The mobile environment aggravates some of 
the security concerns and threats. Mobile users will use resources 
at various locations and this may be provided by different service 
providers. Integrity and confidentiality of information stored on 
the mobile appliance is another important concern. A competing 
system that has emerged recently is ECC [10]. 
ECC  is  a  public  key  cryptography  system  superior  to  the 
well-known RSA cryptography: for the same key size, it gives a 
higher security level than RSA [3] [14]. From the time when the 
use of elliptic curves in public key cryptography was suggested 
in 1985, increasingly effective implementations of ECC systems 
have  been  developed.  Today,  these  systems  are  as  fast  as 
systems  based  on  integer  factoring  with  same  key  length  [1]. 
Elliptic  curves  have  been  broadly  used  in  the  design  of 
cryptosystems [2] [17]. ECC has been adopted in a wide variety 
of  applications  from  digital  certificates  in  web  server 
authentication to embedded processors in wearable devices [4] 
[19].  Elliptic  curve  cryptography  plays  an  important  role  in 
authentication and encryption protocols [5] [18]. 
ECCs are used commonly in constrained environments, such 
as  portable  and  wireless  devices,  as  a  small-area,  low-energy 
alternative to the RSA cryptosystem. The primary application of 
ECC is secure key agreement and digital signature generation 
and verification [6]. In both of these applications the primary 
optimization criterion from the implementation point of view is 
the minimum latency (rather than the maximum throughput) [7]. 
An elliptic curve is a type of cubic curve whose solutions are 
confined to a region of space that is topologically equivalent to a 
torus [8]. The crucial property of an elliptic curve is that we can 
define a rule for adding two points which are on the curve, to 
obtain a third point which is also on the curve. This addition rule 
satisfies  the  normal  properties  of  addition  [9].  Elliptic  curve 
cryptosystems  require  less  computational  power,  memory, 
communication bandwidth and network connectivity [15]. 
The main attraction of ECC over RSA and DSA is because 
they  take  sub-exponential  time  to  solve  the  underlying  hard 
mathematical  problem  in  ECC  (the  elliptic  curve  discrete 
logarithm  problem  (ECDLP)  while  the  best  known  algorithm 
takes full exponential time [11]. The ECC is intended to be used 
in the security layer to automatically encrypt/decrypt all data that 
flows to or from the application layer. We develop a front-end 
program to demonstrate the functionality of the ECC. This front-
end program utilizes the ECC to encrypt a plain text data file. 
The program can be used on /computing devices in order to store 
confidential  data  securely  onto  the  device.  In  addition  to 
encryption  and  decryption,  ECC  can  be  applied  to  other 
applications such as Digital Signatures, Mutual Authentication, 
and  Secure  Data  Transmission  [10].  ECC  is  becoming  the 
mainstream  cryptographic  scheme  in  all  mobile  and  wireless 
devices. Smart cards are one of the most popular devices for the 
use of ECC and many manufacturing companies produce smart 
cards that make use of elliptic curve digital signature algorithms 
[13]. Elliptic curve cryptography has become the cryptography 
of  choice  for  mobile  computing  and  communications  devices 
due to its size and efficiency benefits [16]. Some of the works 
that  have  been  done  with  Elliptic  Curve  Cryptography  is 
reviewed in the following section.  
2. RELATED WORKS  
Pathak et al. [20] have proposed a new modified algorithm 
called  ‘Direct  Recoding  Method’  for  computation  of  signed 
binary  representation.  Their  proposed  method  has  been  more 
efficient  compared  to  other  standard  methods  such  as  NAF, 
MOF and complementary recoding method. Rahila Bilal et al. 
[21] has discussed  that Elliptic Curve Cryptography  has  been K THILAGAVATHI
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one of the most interesting research topic in VLSI. FPGA based 
architecture for elliptic curve cryptography coprocessor, which 
has promising performance in terms of both Space Complexity 
and  Time  Complexity  has  been  proposed  in  their  paper.  The 
modules have been simulated using Modelsim SE software and 
synthesized using Xilinx ISE 9.2i software. Experimental results 
have shown that ECC coprocessor realized in their architecture 
can speed up an elliptic curve scalar multiplication suitable for 
low  area  constraint  applications  and  very  high  speed 
applications. 
Adnan Abdul-Aziz Gutub [22] has designed and modeled an 
improved  parallel  elliptic  curve  processor.  The  Jacobian 
coordinates system has been adjusted by interacting point double 
and point add operations. Results have shown that their proposed 
modified  Jacobian  design  gives  higher  speed  and  cost  (AT2) 
showing  attractive  research  direction.  Rahila  Bilal  et  al.  [23] 
have presented an article on the design of a crypto processor to 
implement  the  Elliptic  curve  point  multiplication  .They  have 
investigated the potential of the hardware/software co-design to 
realize a  flexible  – low resource Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
(ECC)  processor  over  binary  fields  GF(2163)  on  FPGA 
platforms.  The  implemented  processor  has  presented  a  good 
performance, which is very suitable for applications that require 
high  speed.  Portilla  et.  al.[24]  has  described  how  the 
reconfiguration possibilities of the system could be used to adapt 
ECC parameters in order to increase or reduce the security level 
depending  on  the  application  scenario  or  the  energy  budget. 
According to the results, the FPGA-based ECC implementation 
has required three orders of magnitude less energy, compared to 
a low power microcontroller implementation, even considering 
the  power  consumption  overhead  introduced  by  the  hardware 
reconfiguration. 
Kumar et al. [25] have proposed a Region-Based structure 
that  enables  efficient  and  secure  peer-to-peer  information 
sharing over MANETs. The implementation has shown that the 
proposed scheme as secure, scalable, efficient, and adaptive to 
node  mobility  and  provider  of  reliable  information  sharing. 
Rajaram  Ramasamy  et.  al.  [26]  have  illustrated  encryption  / 
decryption  involving  the  ASCII  value  of  the  characters 
constituting the message, and then it has been subjected to the 
knapsack  algorithm.  They  have  compared  their  proposed 
algorithm with RSA algorithm and shown that their algorithm is 
better due to the high degree of sophistication and complexity 
involved. It has been almost infeasible to attempt a brute force 
attack. PrasannaGanesan [27] has highlighted that the existing 
authentication  protocols,  based  on  RSA  asymmetric 
cryptography, have not been appropriate for such devices due to 
their  limitations  in  computing  power,  memory  capacity,  key 
sizes and cryptographic support. Therefore, an efficient protocol 
for  resource  constrained  platforms  that  achieves  a  level  of 
security similar to the one achieved by the protocols that are then 
in use has been designed and implemented. This protocol has 
been  based  solely  on  Elliptic  curve  asymmetric  cryptography 
and the results have proved that the performance achieved has 
been good compared to RSA. 
From the above literature review, it can be seen that the ECC 
is  utilized  in  number  of  applications.  But,  the  works  that  are 
done for networks security, especially mobile networks is less. 
Hence,  in  our  research  we  have  utilized  ECC  to  develop 
authentication protocols for secure mobile networks. In the first 
work, we have proposed a direct authentication protocol and in 
the second work, we have proposed an indirect authentication 
protocol.  Both  the  protocols  have  their  own  advantages  and 
disadvantages over the others. A very brief description about the 
two protocols is given in the subsequent Section. 
3. PROPOSED  DIRECT  AND  INDIRECT 
AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS 
The  proposed  direct  [38]  and  indirect  authentication 
protocols  [39]  have  utilized  ECC  for  key  generation  and  the 
protocols are developed in such way that it can authenticate the 
user or information requester very effectively.  
3.1  DIRECT AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL 
In the situation of requesting information by base station to the 
user node, the user node need to authenticate and then only it has 
to  send  the  information  to  base  station  only  if  it  is  valid.  The 
protocol  flow  is  given  in  Fig.1  and  the  procedure  is  described 
below. 
 
Fig.1. Protocol flow for Direct Authentication 
The set of procedure followed in the Direct Authentication 
are as follows, 
 Initially, base station generates a random number r1  
 Then, base station calculates the requesting code Rc as,  
  Rc = r1 * B  (1) 
 Base station sends Rc to user node 
 Node generates a random number r2 and sends it to base 
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 Base  station  generates  authentication-verifying  code  AVc, 
which can be calculated as 
  AVc = r1 + (r2 * Ks)  (2) 
 Node performs authentication as, 
  (AVc * B) – (r2 * Kp) = Rc  (3) 
3.2  INDIRECT AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL 
In  the  Indirect  authentication  protocol,  two  servers  are 
utilized to perform authentication, one is  main server and the 
other one is authentication server. The protocol flow is given in 
Fig.2 and the procedures are described below. 
 
Fig.2. Protocol flow of Indirect Authentication protocol 
The procedures are given below: 
 User generates ARid, which is a random number, and sends 
it to Authentication Server 
 Authentication  Server  generates  ARint,  another  random 
number, and sends it to Main Server 
 Main Server generates Ackrand and calculates Ag and AgT as 
follows, 
  Ag = B[ARint * Ks(M.S.)]  (4) 
  AgT = [Ackrand * Kp(A.S.) – ARint * Kp(M.S.)]   (5) 
 Main Server sends Ag to Authentication server 
 Authentication Server calculates ATc as given below and 
sends it to user node 
  ATc = [ARid + Ackrand * Ks(A.S.)]B – Ag  (6) 
 User node calculates IRc as given in Eq.(7) and sends IRc 
and ATc to Authentication Server, 
  IRc = ARid * B  (7) 
 Main Server performs authentication as,  
  ATc – AgT = IRc  (8) 
Hence the authentication process is done using the proposed 
indirect authentication protocol. A comparative analysis between 
the  direct  and  indirect  authentication  protocol  empirically  as 
well experimentally is detailed in the following Section. 
4. THE  DIRECT  AND  INDIRECT 
AUTHENTICATION  PROTOCOL:  A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 
A wide experimental analysis as well as empirical analysis 
was made between the proposed techniques. An overall picture 
about the analysis performed in the proposed technique is given 
in Fig.1. As in Fig.1, the comparative analysis can be divided 
into  two,  namely,  efficiency  validation  and  effectiveness 
validation. Generally, the term efficiency, which is a significant 
performance  measure,  is  directly  related  to  the  temporal 
performance  of  any  technique.  The  effectiveness,  which  is 
another performance measure, directly related to the performance 
of the technique in fulfilling the purpose/requirement.  
As discussed in [39] [38], the elliptic curve cryptography is 
better  than  the  RSA  public  key  cryptography  because  even 
though the RSA exploits the largest prime numbers for providing 
security  that  can  also  be  hacked  by  the  hackers.  In  order  to 
provide high security than RSA, the elliptic curve cryptography 
is utilized in this mechanism. In this ECC the elliptical point is 
utilized  and  here  both  the  protocols  are  utilizes  the  ECC 
mechanism. In direct protocol, the node can be access the base 
station directly without any intermediary nodes, it may provide 
easy access but security may less due to its direct access. But in 
the indirect protocol, two servers are involved and hence it is 
difficult to hack the information even though the hackers hacked 
a severs' information or they hacked both the servers they are 
unaware  of  the  relationship  among  them.  Hence  the  indirect 
authentication  protocol  provides  more  security  than  the  direct 
protocol.  
 
Fig.3. Structural view of the performance metrics to analyze the 
protocols 
Here, we empirically as well as experimentally analyze the 
performance  of  the  technique  in  terms  of  efficiency  and 
effectiveness. To accomplish this, we consider four significant 
efficiency measures. They are, 
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 Computational Overhead  
 Total Computational Cost 
 Communication Overhead 
 Storage Overhead 
For effectiveness validation, we consider three major attacks 
in any networking environment. They are  
 Replay attack 
 Guessing attack 
 Stolen-Verifier attack 
Prior  to  analyzing  the  techniques  using  these  measures,  a 
general  as  well  as  technical  description  of  these  measures  is 
discussed in the following. 
Computational Overhead:  
Overhead is normally said to be some mix of too much or 
implicit  computation  time,  memory,  bandwidth,  or  alternative 
resources that are necessary to accomplish a specific objective. 
The  traffics  are  computed  using  protocols  by  considering  the 
signaling  traffic  of  the  protocols.  It  is  observed  that  the  base 
protocol has the lowest traffic, which implies that the complexity 
is  low  both  at  MNs  and  Mobility  Agents.    In  addition  the 
bandwidth  required  is  low.  But,  it  has  poor  security.  Yang’s 
protocol and self certified time invariant protocols have highest 
overhead  and  strong  security  [29].  Real  time  communication 
encryption  is  based  on  public  key,  so  the  protocol  has  lower 
communication  and  computation  overheads.  In  symmetric 
message authentication scheme, the MAC of the sent encrypted 
data  is  computed  by  the  receiver,  packet  modification  during 
transit  is  prevented  to  restrict  the  pollution  attack.  Then  a 
random number k is obtained by decrypting. After that, this k is 
compared with the random number k sent by the receiver. This 
achieves data authentication as a particular sender is identified 
by the set index. When members join the multicast group, the 
group manager circulates the used symmetric key created along 
with the private decryption  key  to the  group  members.  Large 
computation overhead is required by this protocol [32]. 
Communication Overhead:  
The  amount  of  data  transmitted  between  the  reader  and 
authentication server determines the cost of communication. A 
low communication cost  will improve the performance of the 
application by lessening the network traffic and workload on the 
server [29]. Both computation and communication performance 
is improved. Due to the possibility of using resource broker for 
batching  authentication  sessions,  significant  improvement  is 
achieved in communication [28]. The tag-reader is found to be 
most efficient when the number of interchanged messages for 
accomplishing mutual authentication is considered. Four rounds 
may be regarded as the appropriate number of rounds for mutual 
authentication in RFID environments due to the fact that low 
cost tags are passive and communication can only be started by a 
reader [30]. Their model incurs large communication overhead 
in  node  re-authentication,  though  sink  or  base  station  is  not 
necessitated by the mobile node and the authentication protocol 
supporting  node  mobility,  for  authentication  and  key 
distribution. The communication overhead between a sink and 
the base station can be decreased by an efficient untraceable re-
authentication  and  key  distribution  protocol.  [33].  An  ACK 
message containing two fields: a node id and a MAC, is included 
by the communication overhead for confirming a pair wise key 
[34].  Only  four  messages  are  used  by  Gossamer  for 
accomplishing mutual authentication and integrity protection. A 
“hello” and IDS message are sent by means of the channel in the 
identification  phase.  The  authentication  phase  transmits  the 
messages A||B||C and D. Therefore, if 5 bytes are assumed for 
the  “hello”  message,  then  an  aggregate  of  424  bits  are 
transferred over the channel [35]. 
Storage Overhead:  
Assuming L-bits as the size of all components, an L-bit index 
pseudonym (IDS) and a four L-bit component associate key (K) 
has  to  be  stored  by  each  tag.  In  addition,  a  distinct  L-bit 
identification  number  (ID)  has  to  be  stored  by  the  tag.  It 
necessitates a memory of 6L bits as the reader has to store the 
same information [30]. Their use on devices having restricted 
resource  is  impractical  because  asymmetric  cryptographic 
mechanisms  have  increased  computation,  communication,  and 
storage overhead [36]. A priori high execution time of the CPU, 
battery consumption and storage capacity of the mobile device 
are necessary for its use, even though the use of cryptographic 
operations improve network security [37]. 
Total Computational Cost:  
The overall execution time taken by the any protocol/process 
can be simply defined as total computational cost. In some point, 
the  computational  cost  includes  the  requirements  needed  to 
execute  the  protocol. The requirement  may  be  hardware/software 
modules.  
Replay Attack:  
A  replay  attack  is  a  kind  of  network  attack  which 
fraudulently or maliciously repeats or delays the legitimate data 
transmission.  A  replay  attack  happens  when  a  stream  of 
messages between two parties is copied by the attacker and the 
stream is replayed to one or more of the parties.  
Guessing Attack:  
A  password  guessing  attack  happens  when  log  on  to  a 
computer or network is repetitiously attempted by an illegal user 
through  guessed  username  and  password.  Several  password 
guessing programs are available in the internet  which tries to 
break passwords. The diverse types of password guessing attacks 
are as follows:  
Brute force attack:  
A  brute  force  attack  or  exhaustive  key  search  is  an 
approach  that  can  hypothetically  be  used  against  any 
encrypted data by an attacker [1] if he is not able to make 
his/her  job  easier  by  exploiting  some  weak-point  in  the 
encryption system.  
Dictionary attack:  
A  dictionary  attack  in  cryptanalysis  and  computer 
security is a method for defeating a cipher or authentication 
system that attempts identification of decryption key or pass-
phrase  of  authorized  system  by  searching  the  probable 
possibilities. 
Stolen-Verifier attack:  
Attackers always target the servers because several secrets of 
customers are stored in their databases Hence, majority of the 
available password authentication schemes, stores the verifier of 
the user (e.g., plaintext passwords or hashed passwords) instead 
of the bare password of the user in the server to decrease the ISSN: 2229-6948(ONLINE)                                                                                             ICTACT JOURNAL ON COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY, MARCH 2012, VOLUME: 03, ISSUE: 01 
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security  breach  in  case  the  server  is  compromised.  Stolen-
verifier attack is said to be the masquerading attempt made by 
the  adversary  as  a  legitimate  user  by  directly  using  the 
password-verifier  which  is  stolen  from  the  server.  Stolen-
Verifier  attack  is  considered  as  a  critical  problem  in 
authentication  schemes.  So,  instead  of  the  clear  text  of 
passwords,  verifiers  of  the  passwords  of  users  are  stored  by 
servers.  Stolen-Verifier  attack  is  an  objectionable  action 
performed  by  an  attacker  who  has  obtained  a  verifier  for  a 
particular user by compromising the password database. Security 
schemes are strongly needed to defy this attack as attacks carried 
out by internal users have become increased and more critical 
nowadays.  Alleviating  the  pressing  danger  to  the  authenticate 
user  is  the  major  objective of  any  authentication  scheme  that 
safeguards against the Stolen-Verifier attack. The launching of a 
guessing attack is common by an adversary who has a password-
verifier. This attack scheme is not good for masquerading as the 
legal user or system. The merit of verifier-based authentication 
mechanism is due to the fact that password guessing consumes 
the time of the attacker when the verifier is stolen. Although it 
can resist the stolen-verifier attack, it succumbs to other easier 
attacks such as denial-of-service attack and replay attack. On the 
other  hand,  the  strong-password  authentication  schemes  are 
prone to stolen verifier attacks and guessing attacks. If verifiable 
information cannot be  stolen if verification table or password 
table that contain this information are not stored in servers or 
registration center. So such methods can resist against the stolen 
verifier  attack.  Many  protocols  and  methods  are  proposed  to 
protect the stolen-verifier problem. 
4.1  THE PROPOSED PROTOCOLS: AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS 
In this section, the protocols are empirically analyzed for the 
efficiency and effectiveness measures.  
4.1.1  Efficiency Measures: 
The  primary  intention  of  the  proposed  authentication 
protocols  is  to  authenticate  the  base  stations  with  reduced 
computational complexity. As the aforesaid efficiency measures 
play a vital role in analyzing the computational complexity of 
the techniques, an empirical analysis of these techniques is given 
below. 
Computational Overhead:  
Practically, the computational overhead can be defined as the 
average  complexity  that  occurs  in  computing  every 
authentication parameters and steps that are to be performed in 
the  protocols.  The  direct  authentication  protocol  [38]  is  very 
simple and it involves performance of extremely small steps and 
computations  using  the  ECC  concepts.  However,  the  indirect 
authentication protocol [39] involves performance of numerous 
steps  and  computations,  both  in  the  main  server  and  the 
authentication  server.  Consequently,  compared  to  the  direct 
authentication protocol, the computation overhead is really high 
for the indirect authentication protocol. 
Total Computational Cost:  
Here, the total computational cost can be defined as the total 
executable time to compute and execute the entire authentication 
protocol.  In  [38],  the  protocol  accomplishes  the 
generation/calculation  of  authentication  variables/authentication 
parameters  in  three  steps,  transfer  of  authentication 
variables/authentication parameters between the node and the base 
station in three steps and finally an authentication process and the 
resultant  transfer.  However,  in  [39]  seven  authentication 
parameters/variables have been calculated. Two steps of transfers 
have  been  performed  between  Authentication  server  and  Main 
server as well as between the Authentication server and the user 
node.  In  addition,  a  single  step  of  authentication 
parameters/variables is carried out between the user node and the 
Main server. Eventually, the authentication process is performed 
at the Main server and the outcome is transferred to the user node. 
Hence, the total computation complexity (or) computational cost 
estimated  can  be  very  high  for  the  protocol  proposed  in  [39] 
compared to that of the protocol proposed in [38].  
Communication Overhead:  
In our case, the communication overhead can be stated as the 
mean  time  taken  in  transferring  every  authentication 
parameter/variable  that  is  involved  in  the  authentication 
protocol. In [38], only three steps are carried out in transferring 
the authentication protocols/variables between the base station 
and the user node. However in [39], four steps are carried out 
between the Authentication server and Main server as well as 
between the Authentication server and the user node. In addition, 
a single step of parameters transfer is done in between the user 
node  and  the  Main  server.  Thus,  totally  five  steps  of 
communication  is  carried  out  between  the  authentication 
members  i.e.  user  node,  Main  server  and  the  Authentication 
server. Ideally, it can be estimated that the protocol, which is 
proposed in [39], has an increased communication overhead of 
around 60% over the protocol that is proposed in [38]. 
Storage Overhead:  
The  protocol  proposed  in  [38]  intends  to  generate  four 
authentication  parameters  and  determine  three  authentication 
parameters. In [39], five authentication parameters are generated 
and then six authentication parameters are determined in every 
protocol  member.  Thus  generated  and  determined  parameters 
needs  to  be  stored  in  the  concerned  protocol  member,  which 
increases the storage overhead as storage overhead is considered 
as the complexity due to the storage of the parameters that are 
involved in the authentication protocol. This makes the storage 
overhead of [39] as much as 63% (estimated) more than that of 
protocol [38]. 
The empirical analysis results are tabulated in Table.1, which 
indicates the parameters and processes that are involved in the 
protocols. 
Table.1. Parameters/Processes influencing in the efficiency 
measures 
Performance 
measures 
Direct 
Authentication 
Protocol 
Indirect Authentication 
Protocol 
Computational 
overhead 
1)  Generation of B 
2)  Generation of r1 
3)  Generation of Ks 
4)  Calculation of Rc 
5)  Calculation of Kp 
6)  Generation of r2 
7)  Calculation of AVc 
8)  Verify 
1) B Generation 
2) Generation of ARid 
3) Ks Generation 
4) ARint Generation 
5) KpCalculation 
6) Ackrand Generation 
7) Ag Calculation 
8) AgT Calculation K THILAGAVATHI
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Authentication  9) ATcCalculation 
10) IRc Calculation 
11)Authentication 
verification 
Communication 
overhead 
1) Rc  from  Base 
station to Node 
2) r2  from  Node  to 
Base station 
3) AVc  from  Base 
station to Node 
4) Resultant  for 
Authentication 
verification 
1) ARid  from  User  node  to 
Authentication server 
2) ARintAuthentication 
server to Main server 
3) Ag  Main  server  to 
Authentication server 
4) ATcAuthentication server 
to User node 
5) ATc
,  IRcUser  node  to 
Authentication server 
6) Resultant  for 
Authentication 
verification 
Storage 
overhead 
B, r1, Ks, Rc, Kp, r2, 
AVc 
B,  ARid,  Ks,  ARint,  Kp, 
Ackrand, Ag, AgT , ATc, IRc 
Total 
computational 
cost 
B, r1, Ks, Rc, Kp, r2, 
AVc, Rc, r2, AVc 
B,  ARid,  Ks,  ARint,  Kp, 
Ackrand, Ag, AgT , ATc, IRc, 
ARid , ARint, Ag, ATc, ATc
, 
IRc 
4.1.2  Effectiveness Measures: 
An empirical analysis of the proposed protocols in terms of 
the effectiveness measures is described in the following sections 
Replay attack:  
It is well known that the replay attack is an attack that is 
done  by  hacking  certain  information  during  the  time  of 
conversation  between  two  communicating  partners  and  then 
using the hacked information in the subsequent communications. 
In protocol [38], information hacking can be done possibly in 
any of the three following steps of communications,  
i.  Transmission of Rc from base station to user node  
ii.  Transmission of r2  from user node to base station 
iii.  Transmission of AVc 
from base station to user node  
In case (i) and (ii), the parameters are arbitrary. Hence the 
probability of using these parameters, after it is hacked, is very 
less. As case (iii) parameter is the final parameter that needs to 
be transferred in the authentication protocol it is not possible to 
use this information in the same protocol even if it is hacked. 
Hence, it can be absolutely confirmed that the proposed protocol 
[38] is robust against replay attack. 
In protocol [38], information hacking can be done during the 
transfer of the following parameters  
i.  Transmission of ARid from user node to Authentication 
Server 
ii.  Transmission  of  ARint  from  Authentication  Server  to 
Main Server 
iii.  Transmission of Ag from Main server to Authentication 
Server 
iv.  Transmission of ATc from Authentication server to user 
node 
v.  Transmission of ATc 
and IRc 
from user node to Main 
Server 
Cases  (i)  and  (ii)  deal  with  the  transfer  of  arbitrary 
parameters and so probability of hacking is very low. In cases 
(iii),  (iv)  and  (v),  the  transferred  parameters  are  determined 
using contribution of arbitrary parameters. Hence, even if these 
parameters are hacked, they cannot be used for replay attack. 
However,  the  robustness  is  relatively  lower  than  that  of  the 
protocol proposed in [38]. 
Guessing Attack:  
In  protocol  [38],  guessing  of  arbitrary  parameters  is  very 
difficult.  The  only  parameter  that  can  be  guessed  is  ATc, 
however it is a contribution of arbitrary numbers. Hence, it is 
robust as long as ATc is not guessed.  
Protocol  [39]  exhibits  more  robustness  than  protocol  [38] 
because it performs authentication not only with the parameters 
of  the  user  node  but  also  with  the  parameters  of  the 
Authentication server. Though the hacker guesses a parameter/ 
user credential, it cannot be used for pretending him/herself as 
the  authenticated  user.  This  is  mainly  because  of  the 
involvement of two servers in the authentication process. The 
strong point is that it is practically impossible to simultaneously 
hack information from the user, Authentication server and the 
Main server. 
Stolen-Verifier Attack:  
In both the protocols, no parameters are constant for any user 
when  they  are  trying  to  access  the  information.  This  can  be 
asserted ideally that the protocols are more robust for the Stolen-
Verifier  attack.  Moreover,  the  protocol  [39]  performs  the 
authentication  using  two  servers.  Even  any  credential  of  the 
information requester is hacked by either of the server; it is not 
acceptable  when  working  with  the  other  servers.  This  further 
claims that the protocol [39] is more robust than the protocol 
[38] against the Stolen-Verifier attack. 
4.2  THE  PROPOSED  PROTOCOLS:  AN 
EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS 
In order to experimentally evaluate the proposed protocols 
[38]  and  [39],  several  efficiency  performance  measures  are 
calculated  and  compared.  The  efficiency  measures  that  are 
determined for the protocols are given in Table.2, 3 and 4. 
Table.2. The efficiency measures (i) Computational Overhead, 
(ii) Communication Overhead, (iii) Storage Overhead for Direct 
Authentication protocol 
Table.2(i) 
Computational Overhead 
Parameters  Time (sec) 
Rc  0.0 
r2  0.0 
AVc  0.0 
Table.2(ii) 
Communication Overhead 
Parameters  Time (sec) 
Rc transfer from Base 
station to Node  3.01050914 × 10
-11 
r2 transfer from Node 
to Base station  2.51100929 × 10
-10 
AVctransfer from Base 
station to Node  2.81294329 × 10
-10 ISSN: 2229-6948(ONLINE)                                                                                             ICTACT JOURNAL ON COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY, MARCH 2012, VOLUME: 03, ISSUE: 01 
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Table.2(iii) 
Storage Overhead 
Parameters  Bytes 
Rcgeneration  8 
Generate r2  8 
Generate AVc  16 
Table.3. The efficiency measures (i) Computational Overhead, 
(ii) Communication Overhead, (iii) Storage Overhead for 
Indirect Authentication protocol 
Table.3(i) 
Computation Overhead 
Parameters  Time (sec) 
ARid  0.0 
ARint  0.0 
Ackrand  0.0 
Ag  0.0 
AgT  0.0 
ATc  0.0 
IRc  0.0 
Table.3(ii) 
Communication Overhead 
Parameters  Time (sec) 
ARid transfer from User 
node to Authentication 
server 
3.10000914 × 10
-11 
ARint transfer from 
Authentication server 
to Main server 
2.18999929 × 10
-10 
Ag transfer from Main 
server Authentication 
server 
1.50000012 × 10
-11 
ATc transfer from 
Authentication server 
to User node 
3.14568212 × 10
-11 
ATc, IRc transfer from 
User node to Main 
server 
2.74572542 × 10
-11 
Table.3(iii) 
Storage Overhead 
Parameters  Bytes 
Generate ARid  8 
Generate ARint  8 
Generate Ackrand  8 
Calculate Ag, AgT  32 
Create ATc  16 
Calculate IRc  16 
In determining the performance m easures that are given in 
Table.2 and Table.3, we have not determined the measures of 
keys as well as authentication process, because these measures 
are common for any protocols. When determining the other 
parameters, it can be visualized that the direct authentication 
protocol  shows  more  efficiency  rather  than  the  indirect 
authentication protocol in terms of communication overhead and 
the storage overhead. In reference to computational overhead, 
both the protocols show similar performance. The performance 
in terms of total computational complexity is tabulated below. 
Table.4. Total Computational Complexity for the proposed 
Direct and Indirect Authentication Protocols 
Protocols  Total Computational 
Complexity (sec) 
Direct Authentication 
Protocol  3.013 
Indirect Authentication 
Protocol  8.781 
From  Table.4,  it  can  be  seen  that  the  direct  authentication 
protocol is more efficient than the indirect authentication protocol. 
In order to visualize the performance of the protocols [38] 
and  [39]  five  different  experiments  were  conducted.  Each 
experiment is comprised of ten rounds of attacks. The robustness 
of the protocols at every experiment is plotted below. 
 
Fig.4(i) 
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Fig.4(iii) 
Fig.4. Effectiveness experiment for the proposed direct and 
indirect authentication protocol against (i) Replay attack, (ii) 
Guessing attack and (iii) Stolen-Verifier attack 
Among  the  five  experiments  conducted  for  replay  attack, 
indirect authentication protocol shows 100% robustness in three 
experiments and 90% robustness in two experiments whereas the 
direct authentication protocol shows 100% robustness in three 
experiments,  90%  and  80%  robustness  in  the  other  two 
experiments.  Working  against  the  guessing  attack,  indirect 
authentication protocol is 100% robust in two experiments and 
90% robust in three experiments whereas direct authentication 
protocol is 100%, 90% and 80% robust in one, three and one 
experiment  respectively.  Indirect  authentication  protocol  is 
100% robust in all the experiments against Stolen-Verifier attack 
whereas the direct authentication protocol achieved 100% robust 
in four experiments and 90% in an experiment.  
The  overall  performance  can  be  visualized  by  taking  the 
mean robustness for all experiments. The overall performance is 
illustrated in Fig.3. 
 
Fig.5. Mean robustness of the proposed protocols against the 
attacks 
From Fig.5, it can be seen that the Indirect Authentication 
protocol is 96%, 94% and 100% robust against replay, guessing 
and  Stolen-verifier  attacks  respectively  whereas  the  direct 
authentication  protocol  is  94%,  90%  and  98%  robust  against 
replay, guessing and Stolen-verifier attacks respectively. In an 
average,  indirect  authentication  protocol  is  2.6%  more  robust 
than direct authentication protocol. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
In  the  previous  two  works,  we  have  proposed  two 
authentication protocols for mobile networks based on ECC. The 
protocols  had  taken  the  advantage  of  elliptic  curve  properties 
and  hence  it  had  been  developed  to  provide  the  secure 
environment for mobile networks. A wide empirical analysis as 
well  as  the  experimental  analysis  had  been  made  over  the 
proposed two protocols. One of the proposed two protocols is of 
direct type and the other one of indirect authentication type. To 
validate  the  efficiency  of  the  protocols,  we  have  utilized  the 
performance  measures  such  as  computational  overhead, 
communication overhead, storage overhead and computational 
complexity. To evaluate the effectiveness of the protocols, the 
protocol is subjected to assumed environment with replay attack, 
guessing attack and stolen-verifier attack. In analyzing different 
views, the indirect authentication protocol based on ECC seems 
to  be  effective  however  the  direct  authentication  protocol  is 
efficient.  Hence,  depends  on  the  application  and  the 
environment,  the  protocol  can  be  utilized  to  make  a  secure 
environment in mobile networks. 
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